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Abstract
We show that price level stabilization is not optimal in an economy where
agents have incomplete knowledge about the policy implemented and try to
learn it. A systematically more accommodative policy than what agents
expect generates short term gains without triggering an abrupt loss of con-
fidence, since agents update expectations sluggishly. In the long run agents
learn the policy implemented, and the economy converges to a rational ex-
pectations equilibrium in which policy does not stabilize prices, economic
volatility is high, and agents suffer the corresponding welfare losses. How-
ever, these losses are outweighed by short term gains from the learning
phase.
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No monetary authority sets price level stabilization1 as its official goal, despite
economists’ recommendation that this is the best way to conduct monetary policy.
This is not because policymakers do not take this recommendation seriously. In
fact, Sweden in the 1930s even introduced price level stabilization as the official
goal of its monetary policy, after a public debate in which economists supported
it.2 However, this policy was abandoned within the same decade, and today the
official goal of Swedish monetary policy is inflation stabilization. More recently,
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Canada considered introducing long
run price stability as its official monetary policy goal, but decided against it.
Policymakers admit that their main concern with this policy recommendation is
that the public may have difficulties in understanding it because of its complicated
timing and response to shocks.3
This paper rationalizes why monetary authorities are so reluctant to implement
price level stabilization. We examine the implications of this concern in a standard
macroeconomic model, and we demonstrate that price level stabilization is not
optimal if there is even the minimal chance that private sector misunderstands the
policy regime.
In our setup, there is a stabilization role for monetary policy, i.e. reducing
economic fluctuations by dampening the effect of shocks on aggregate variables.
Firms and households know the structure of the economy, but do not perfectly
understand how aggregate allocations are impacted by monetary policy. If their
understanding were perfect, they could form accurate expectations about how
equilibrium allocations depend on shocks. This is the standard rational expecta-
tions assumption, and in this case it is a well established result (see for example
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Ambler (2009)) that price level stabilization
1Price level stabilization implies counteracting the effect of shocks on the price level.
2Swedish economists, like Gustav Cassel, David Davidson and Eli Heckscher held their firm
support in public debates for price level targeting, and had a great influence on the government.
Knut Wicksell in 1898 was the first in Sweden to present the view that the central bank should
aim for price level stabilisation.
3This is very transparent in the “Renewal of the Inflation-Control Target” document of the
Bank of Canada. The authors write: “[...] these models assume that agents are forward looking,
fully conversant with the implications of [price level stabilization] and trust policy-makers to
live up to their commitments.” (p14.) They argue that it is not clear that these conditions
are “sufficiently satisfied in the real world for the Bank to have confidence that price level
[stabilization] could improve on the current inflation targeting framework.”
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is optimal.
We slightly depart from the assumption of rational expectations by postulating
that agents do not know the exact mapping between shocks and aggregate variables
induced by monetary policy.4 We assume agents learn the mapping between shocks
and aggregate variables by extrapolating from historical patterns in observed data.
More specifically, they rely on econometric methods to estimate a model of the
economy and use it for forecasting future aggregate variables. In each period, as
new observations are available, they update their model in order to have more
precise beliefs. Therefore, they have a chance to learn the exact mapping (i.e.,
one that is consistent with rational expectations beliefs), provided they can collect
enough data. The novelty of our setup is that a benevolent, fully rational monetary
authority can “teach” agents the exact mapping by selecting an appropriate path
for policy. In fact, the exact mapping is endogenous to policy choices. By choosing
a particular policy response to shocks, the central bank affects agent’s beliefs about
the mapping. Those beliefs feed back into the evolution of aggregate variables, and
thus into the mapping between shocks and aggregate variables. To find the optimal
policy, we follow the methodology of Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006) and Molnar
and Santoro (2014), and assume that the central bank takes into account that its
actions affect the data used in agents’ estimations, and how those data affect their
future beliefs.
Our main result is that price level stabilization is no longer optimal if agents are
learning. We show that the policymaker wants to give up the benefits of stabilizing
the price level in favour of short term gains.
The advantage of price level stabilisation arises from its history dependence:
after a temporary shock that increases the price level, the policymaker should
engineer a series of aggregate demand contractions in order to bring the price
level back to its target; in other words, it can spread out the effect of the shock
on the price level through several periods. If agents are aware of this history
4We find this assumption an appealing way to introduce agents’ misunderstanding in an oth-
erwise standard model. Agents’ knowledge of their own optimization problem does not imply
they can derive aggregate allocations that arise in equilibrium (Adam and Marcet (2011)). More-
over, an individual might be uncertain about other agents’ knowledge about the exact mapping,
which in turn would impact the evolution of aggregate variables (see Brock and Hommes (1997),
Branch and McGough (2011), Molnar (2007)).
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dependence, the policymaker can lower agents’ expectations about future inflation
by contracting current output.5 Lower inflation expectations then decrease current
inflation through the Phillips Curve.6
Under learning the central bank can attain short term gains because agents
revise their beliefs very sluggishly. We show that under learning it is optimal
to contract current output very aggressively, instead of spreading out the output
contractions over several periods. The policymaker can do this because agents
need to gather sufficient amount of data to uncover that the policy has become
less history dependent. In the meantime the policymaker can still anchor inflation
expectations, and lower current inflation by contracting output. With such a
policy, future output contractions are small or absent, and therefore they are
not sufficient to bring the price level back to target. Hence, the price level rises
permanently.
In the long run, monetary policy completely looses its ability to engineer a
history dependent policy that could anchor agents’ inflation expectations, because
agents eventually learn that the policymaker is not implementing a price level
stabilization policy. This policy can be described as stabilizing inflation instead
of the price level. Under this policy, the central bank responds to shocks as long
as they affect inflation. A temporary shock that increases the price level affects
inflation on impact, but not in the future. Therefore the central bank counteracts
the effect of the shock in the current period, but it does not spread it over future
periods (see Gali (2003)). The long run policy recommendation is therefore in line
with what many central banks set as their official goal.
In our framework, the standard assumptions for proving convergence commonly
used in the learning literature are not satisfied. This complication arises because
of the interaction between atomistic learning agents and a rational strategic player
(the central bank), which the previous literature did not consider. We therefore
derive a novel convergence theorem that can accommodate the interaction between
5Evans and Honkapohja (2006) shows a policy that can convince learning agents that price
level stabilization is in place. Note that, once agents have learned the mapping that would
arise under rational expectations, the advantage of price level stabilization is similar under both
learning and rational expectations.
6Our model is a sticky price framework. Inflation depends on inflation expectations because
firms know they might not be able to reset their price in the future, therefore have to be forward
looking when setting their price.
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updating rules for agents’ beliefs and the choices of the rational central bank. This
methodological contribution might be of separate interest to some readers, as our
theorem and our line of proof could be applied in similar problems with a linear-
quadratic setup.
There are several strands of existing literature on price level stabilization that
are relevant to this paper. Many authors have shown its robustness: it anchors
inflation expectations even if the central bank makes mistakes in forecasting out-
put (Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2007)) or faces model uncertainty (Aoki and
Nikolov (2006)). By committing to a price level path, policy can alleviate the
risks of hitting the zero lower bound (Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Wolman
(2005)). Contrary to these findings, our result is that price level stabilization is
not the best policy if agents are not fully rational when facing a strategic central
bank. Our results, however, do not call into question the long run advantages
of price level stabilization. As we discussed before, in our model long run bene-
fits arise purely from anchoring future inflation expectations. In a more general
model, there are further advantages from the reduced long term variability of the
price level for long-run nominal contracts and long run intertemporal decisions.
For example Meh, Ros-Rull, and Terajima (2010) shows that price stabilization
reduces long run redistributional effects from lenders to borrowers. Our result
introduces an additional argument into this policy debate: the incentives of a
rational policymaker change when there is even the smallest chance that agents
could misunderstand policy choices.
This paper belongs to an extensive literature examining monetary policy when
agents are learning. Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans and Honkapohja (2003) and
Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2008), among others, show that policy rules
that have good properties under rational expectations can have unintended and
undesirable consequences if instead agents are learning. Our paper furthers this
line of inquiry by considering how learning allows the central bank to do something
better than price level stabilization, even if the latter remains a feasible and, in
the long run, attractive strategy.
Our work is also related to a wider literature that proposes learning as a useful
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way to evaluate and modify the traditional equilibrium concepts.7 Learning mech-
anisms proposed by the literature range from simple rules of thumb, to more so-
phisticated rules like Bayesian learning (see for example Beggs (2005) and Borgers
and Sarin (1997)) and adaptive learning (i.e. learning with econometric methods),
like the one we use in this paper. Adaptive learning is especially useful when agents
learn about a self referential variable (i.e. one which depends on the agents’ ac-
tions), mostly because in this case Bayesian learning rules are intractable.8 In self
referential models, least squares learning has long been used for refining rational
expectation equilibria. Several authors in particular have used least squares learn-
ing for equilibrium selection, and for asking how policy can guarantee a learnable
equilibrium (see, among others Eusepi and Preston (2010), Marcet and Sargent
(1989a), Marimon and Sunder (1993), Adam (2003), Bullard and Mitra (2002), and
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for an extensive survey). This paper refines the ex-
isting concept of learnability, by taking into account strategic interaction among
players with different expectations formation mechanisms. Our model features two
rational expectations equilibria which are both learnable; yet, the incentives of an
optimizing rational agent eliminate one of the learnable equilibria.
Our analysis highlights an important message about adaptive learning: even if
agents learn rational expectations equilibria and their forecasts cannot be distin-
guished from a rational agent, they do not form strategies like a rational player.
Therefore, a rational agent facing learners will not behave in the same way as when
facing rational agents. When a rational policymaker faces rational agents, a devia-
tion from the price stabilizing policy would be immediately realized by agents, who
in turn would change their beliefs abruptly and assume the central bank is follow-
ing an alternative policy. This off-equilibrium threat of rational agents can keep
the central bank from deviating from the price stabilizing policy (see Kurozumi
(2008)). In contrast, adaptive learners do not have separate off-equilibrium strate-
gies. They only learn from realized outcomes, and their strategies are the same with
a deviating and not-deviating central bank. This lack of off-equilibrium strategies
7A learning model in the broad sense is “any model that specifies the learning rules used by
individual players, and examines their interaction”(Fudenberg and Levine (1998) p3).
8A rational Bayesian learner would understand how its actions impact on the variable in
question, and would not treat the posterior as random, but instead would have to calculate the
posterior as a complicated fixed point problem.
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provides strong incentives for the rational policymaker to deviate from the price
stabilization policy.
1 The Model
We consider the baseline version of the New Keynesian model, and as it is standard,
we log-linearize the equilibrium equations and take a second-order Taylor approx-
imation of the agent’s utility function. The economy is therefore characterized by
two structural equations.9 The first one is an IS equation:
xt = E
∗
t xt+1 − σ−1(rt − E∗t pit+1), (1)
where xt, rt and pit denote the time t output gap (i.e. the difference between
actual and natural output), the short-term nominal interest rate and inflation,
respectively; σ is a parameter of the household’s utility function, representing risk
aversion. Note that the operator E∗t represents agents’ conditional expectations,
which are not necessarily rational. The above equation is derived by log-linearizing
the household’s Euler equation and imposing the equilibrium condition that con-
sumption equals output.
The second equation is the so-called New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC):
pit = βE
∗
t pit+1 + κxt + ut, (2)
where β denotes the subjective discount rate, κ is a function of structural parame-
ters, and ut ∼ N(0, σ2u) is a white noise cost-push shock10; this relation is obtained
from optimal pricing decisions of monopolistically competitive firms whose prices
are staggered a` la Calvo (1983).11
9For details of the derivation of the structural equations of the New Keynesian model see,
among others, Yun (1996), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003).
10Note that the cost-push shock is usually assumed to be an AR(1) process, however we instead
assume it to be iid to make the problem more tractable. This assumption is also supported by
Milani (2006), who shows that learning can endogenously generate persistence in inflation data,
and assuming a strongly autocorrelated cost-push shock becomes redundant.
11In other words, the probability that a firm in period t can reset the price is constant over
time and across firms.
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The central bank (CB in short) is benevolent and therefore acts as the social
planner. It then maximizes the agents’ utility function subject to the structural
equations described above. By deriving a second-order approximation for the
utility function, we can express the objective of the central bank as a loss function
in the following form:
E0(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
pi2t + αx
2
t
)
, (3)
where α is the relative weight put by the CB on the objective of output gap
stabilization.12
1.1 Price level targeting vs inflation targeting under RE
Assume that the private sector has rational expectations (RE in short), and that
the CB can credibly commit to a future course of action. The policy problem is
to minimize the social welfare loss (3), subject to the structural equations (1) and
(2), where E∗t is replaced by Et:
min
{pit,xt,rt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
pi2t + αx
2
t
)
(4)
s.t.(1), (2)
As shown, among others, in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), the optimality
conditions of this problem are:
pi0 = −α
κ
x0 (5)
pit = −α
κ
xt +
α
κ
xt−1, t ≥ 1 (6)
12 Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) show how (3) can be obtained as a quadratic approxima-
tion to the expected household’s utility function. The parameter α is a function of structural
parameters.
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Hence, the optimality condition at time 0 is different from that holding at t ≥ 1.
The term in xt−1 that appears when t ≥ 1 represents the past promises that
the CB committed to realize at time t; hence, is absent for t = 0, when there
are no promises to be kept. A policy characterized by the equations (5)-(6) is
prone to time inconsistency: if the policymaker could reoptimize at a date T > 0,
the optimality condition at T would be different from that implied by (6). We
follow Woodford (2003)’s “timeless perspective” and use (6) as the only relevant
optimality condition.
Combining (6) with the NKPC (2), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) shows
that output gap and inflation evolve according to the following law of motion:
xt = b
xxt−1 + cxut (7)
pit = b
pixt−1 + cpiut (8)
where the coefficients are given by:
bx =
κ2 + α(1 + β)−√(κ2 + α(1 + β))2 − 4α2β
2αβ
(9)
bpi =
α
κ
(1− bx) (10)
cx = −κb
x
α
(11)
cpi = −α
κ
cx (12)
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) show that the policy implied by (7)-(8) is equiv-
alent to price level targeting (PLT in short): the central bank responds to changes
in the price level, and tries to keep prices close to a predetermined value.
Now assume the central bank cannot commit to future policy, and therefore
it acts discretionarily when a shock hits the economy. In this case, the monetary
authority solves the problem 4 by taking future expected policy as given. Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (1999) shows that the optimal allocation obeys the following
equation
pit = −α
κ
xt (13)
Using the NKPC (2), it is easy to show that output gap and inflation are charac-
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terized by
xt = − κ
α + κ2
ut (14)
pit =
α
α + κ2
ut (15)
We call this inflation targeting (IT in short), since as shown in Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (1999) the central bank responds to changes in inflation, trying to stabilize
the inflation rate.
These policies differ in a crucial respect. The PLT policy is an inertial policy
in the sense of Woodford (1999): the current allocations depend on past levels of
output gap. At the contrary, the IT policy only depends on current shocks.
1.2 Learning specification
In the rest of the paper, we dispose of the assumption that the private sector has
RE. Following Molnar and Santoro (2014), we posit that the central bank is fully
rational. However, we assume that agents are adaptive learners. This assumption
postulates that agents know the structure of the economy, and they are able to
calculate the rational expectations equilibrium. However, they are uncertain about
some parameters’ values. Hence, they estimate equilibrium conditions by observing
past and current allocations.13
More precisely, we assume that agents do not know the exact process followed
by the endogenous variables, but recursively estimate a Perceived Law of Motion
(PLM) consistent with the law of motion that they would observe if the central
bank followed the PLT policy under RE, i.e. (7)-(8). Hence, the PLM is:
pit = b
pixt−1 + cpiut (16)
xt = b
xxt−1 + cxut, (17)
Under learning, agents estimate the coefficients in equations (16)-(17), and use
13The modern literature on adaptive learning was initiated by Marcet and Sargent (1989b),
who were the first to apply stochastic approximation techniques to study the convergence of
learning algorithms. For an extensive monograph on this paradigm, see Evans and Honkapohja
(2001).
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their estimates of bpit−1 and b
x
t−1 to make forecasts:
E∗t pit+1 = b
pi
t−1xt (18)
E∗t xt+1 = b
x
t−1xt (19)
Notice that equations (16)-(17) are consistent with both PLT and IT policies.
Hence, this specification allows agents to potentially learn both those policies.
Intuitively, if the central bank consistently implements a PLT policy, agents would
learn this policy. On the other hand, if the central bank consistently implements
the IT policy, agents’ beliefs about equations (16)-(17) will eventually be consistent
with an IT policy. In other words, the model that agents estimate is consistent
with both policies, and hence the central bank can potentially make them learn
one or the other.
In the above equations we are assuming that xt is part of the time t informa-
tion set of the agents. This introduces a simultaneity problem between E∗t yt+1 and
yt that complicates the analysis of asymptotic convergence of the beliefs. In the
learning literature this simultaneity problem is often solved by adopting a differ-
ent timing convention, such that realized values of the endogenous variables y are
included in the time t information set only up to time t−1. However, this alterna-
tive information assumption would increase the dimension of the state space: the
forecasts of pit+1 and xt+1 would become:
E∗t pit+1 = b
pi
t−1
(
bxt−1xt−1 + c
x
t−1ut
)
(20)
E∗t xt+1 = b
x
t−1
(
bxt−1xt−1 + c
x
t−1ut
)
. (21)
Since expectations depend also on the estimated values of the coefficients cpi and
cx, an optimizing CB should take those (and their recursive estimation algorithm)
into account. The central bank problem would then have two more state variables,
with significant additional complications in the numerical exercise. To avoid this
complications, we assume that agents’ estimates are obtained with stochastic gra-
dient learning. This assumption substantially implies that we can abstract from
the evolution of the estimated second moments of the regressors, and hence for-
get about cpi and cx. The recursive updating formula for the remaining estimated
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coefficients is then
bpit = b
pi
t−1 + γtxt−1
(
pit − xt−1bpit−1
)
(22)
bxt = b
x
t−1 + γtxt−1
(
xt − xt−1bxt−1
)
, (23)
where γt is the so called gain parameter. When deriving our analytical results,
we use γt =
1
t
(in the literature this is called decreasing gain learning). For the
numerical exercises, we use γt = γ for some small number γ (this is defined as
constant gain learning). The latter is done for presentational purposes only, and
numerical results with decreasing gain are available upon request.
2 Optimal monetary policy
In this section, we derive the optimal monetary policy and prove the main conver-
gence result. To ease analytical tractability, we assume agents follow decreasing
gain learning, so that their estimates can eventually settle down to a limit point.
Since the dynamic problem is non-standard, we first show that it has a recursive
formulation where the state variables are the output gap, the parameters of the
PLM, and the gain parameter. We then show that under the optimal policy, the
IT equilibrium is stable under learning.
2.1 Recursivity
We start stating the control problem of the central bank in the case of decreasing
gain. We write it as a maximization (instead of a minimization) problem, in order
to refer more directly to the dynamic programming results.
12
sup
{pit,xt,rt,bpit ,bxt }∞t=0
E0(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
−1
2
(
pi2t + αx
2
t
)]
s.t.
xt =
−σ−1rt
1− bxt−1 − σ−1bpit−1
pit = (βb
pi
t−1 + κ)xt + ut
bpit = b
pi
t−1 + γtxt−1
(
pit − xt−1bpit−1
)
bxt = b
x
t−1 + γtxt−1
(
xt − xt−1bxt−1
)
,
x−1, bpi−1, b
x
−1, γ0 given
Since the IS curve is never a binding constraint (the central bank can always
choose an interest rate that satisfy it, given the allocations and the beliefs), we
can dispense from it. Using the NKPC to substitute out pi the problem can be
written in a simpler form:
sup
{xt,bpit ,bxt }∞t=0
E0(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
−1
2
[(
(βbpit−1 + κ)xt + ut
)2
+ αx2t
]}
(24)
s.t.
bpit = b
pi
t−1 + γtxt−1
(
(βbpit−1 + κ)xt + ut − xt−1bpit−1
)
(25)
bxt = b
x
t−1 + γtxt−1
(
xt − xt−1bxt−1
)
, (26)
x−1, bpi−1, b
x
−1, γ0 given (27)
There are five state variables. Three are endogenous (xt−1, bpit−1, b
x
t−1), and take
values in R3. One is exogenous and stochastic (ut), defined over some underlying
probability space, and takes values in a measurable space (Z,Z). Finally, there
is one exogenous and deterministic state (γt) that takes values in a countable
set G ⊂ [0, 1] and evolves following the recursion 1
γt
= 1
γt−1
+ 1. We denote the
state space S ≡ R3 × Z × G. The actions decided by the central bank are three
(xt, b
pi
t , b
x
t ); we denote this vector as a and the action space is R3. The feasibility
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correspondence Γ : S → R3 is defined as follows:
for any s ∈ S, Γ (s) = {a ∈ R3 : equations (25) and (26) hold }
This optimization problem has some non-standard features. First of all, the
graph of the feasibility correspondence is not convex, which implies that usual
tools of concave programming cannot be used. Moreover, Γ is not compact-valued.
Finally, the quadratic return function is unbounded below. For these reasons, in
the statement of the problem we used the sup operator instead of the max, since
the existence of a maximizing plan cannot be taken for granted.
We aim at proving that there exists an optimal time-invariant policy function
that maximizes the objective function in (24). To do so, the strategy we adopt
is the following: we write down a new maximization problem augmented by some
arbitrary constraints that guarantee that the feasibility correspondence is compact-
valued, and show that in this case there exists a time-invariant optimal policy
function; then, we argue that these arbitrary constraints can be chosen so that
they don’t bind in an optimum, and that no optimum of the original problem can
lie outside these constraints. Hence, we conclude that the standard FOCs can be
used to characterize the optima of the original problem.
Note that we do not prove uniqueness of the optimal policy function, but it
is not essential: in the analytical part we show asymptotic results valid for any
optimal policy function, while in the numerical part we check that only one solution
of the FOCs can be found.
We now write the new optimization problem:
sup
{xt,bpit ,bxt }∞t=0
E0(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
−1
2
[(
(βbpit−1 + κ)xt + ut
)2
+ αx2t
]}
(28)
s.t.
bpit = b
pi
t−1 + γtxt−1
(
(βbpit−1 + κ)xt + ut − xt−1bpit−1
)
(29)
bxt = b
x
t−1 + γtxt−1
(
xt − xt−1bxt−1
)
, (30)
x (st) ≥ xt ≥ −x (st) , (31)
x−1, bpi−1, b
x
−1, γ0 given (32)
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where we used the arbitrary continuous function of the states x (st). Let’s now fix
some notation. The vector of the state variables at time t is st ≡ [xt−1, bpit−1, bxt−1, ut, γt]′,
while the vector of choice variables at t is at ≡ [xt, bpit , bxt ]′. We denote with a su-
perscript i the i-th element of a vector. Hence, the evolution of the state variables
can be summarized as follows:
s1t+1 = a
1
t
s2t+1 = a
2
t
s3t+1 = a
3
t
s4t+1 = ξ
s5t+1 =
s5t
1 + s5t
where ξ is the realization of a random variable with the same distribution as u.
We can represent the above relations in a more compact way:
st+1 = Ψ (st, at, ξ) (33)
Note that the operator Ψ is trivially continuous.
The transition probability from the graph of the feasibility correspondence to
a Borel set D ⊂ S is defined as:
Q (D|s, a) =
∫
Z
1D (Ψ (s, a, ξ)) dP (ξ) (34)
where 1D is the indicator function relative to set D, and P is the probability
distribution of ξ.
We can now state and prove this simple Lemma.
Lemma 1. The following results hold:
(i) The feasibility correspondence:
for any s ∈ S, Γc (s) = {a ∈ R3 : equations (29), (30) and (31) hold }
is compact-valued.
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(ii) The feasibility correspondence:
for any s ∈ S, Γc (s) = {a ∈ R3 : equations (29), (30) and (31) hold }
is upper hemi-continuous.
(iii) For any bounded continuous function v : S → R, the function:
F (s, a) =
∫
S
v (y)Q (dy|s, a)
is continuous.
Proof. (i) For any value of s ∈ S, equation (29) is a linear function of bpit and xt,
and analogously equation (30) is a linear function of bxt and xt. Moreover,
define:
b
pi
(st) = max
{
bpit−1 + γtxt−1
(
(βbpit−1 + κ)x (st) + ut − xt−1bpit−1
)
,
bpit−1 + γtxt−1
(
(βbpit−1 + κ) (−x (st)) + ut − xt−1bpit−1
)}
and:
bpi (st) = min
{
bpit−1 + γtxt−1
(
(βbpit−1 + κ)x (st) + ut − xt−1bpit−1
)
,
bpit−1 + γtxt−1
(
(βbpit−1 + κ) (−x (st)) + ut − xt−1bpit−1
)}
and analogously for b
x
(st) and b
x (st). Hence, it is clear that:
Γc (s) ⊂ [−x (s) , x (s)]× [bpi (s) , bpi (s)]× [bx (s) , bx (s)] (35)
Moreover, by linearity (conditional on s) of the equations (29) and (30), we
can argue that Γc (s) is closed; since it is a closed subset of a compact set,
we conclude that it is compact. Since s is arbitrary, Γc is compact-valued.
(ii) Let’s consider an arbitrary sequence {sn} with sn ∈ S for any n, converging
to a point ŝ, and an arbitrary sequence {xn} with xn ∈ [−x (sn) , x (sn)].
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Then by continuity of x (·) it is easy to show that there exists a convergent
subsequence {xnk} whose limit is in [−x (ŝ) , x (ŝ)]; moreover, the functional
form of (29) and (30) (they are formed by sums and products of elements
of {sn} and {xn}) implies that if the subsequences
{
bpink
}
and
{
bxnk
}
satisfy
equations (29) and (30) for any nk, then they converge and the limit satisfies
(29) and (30) evaluated in the limits of {snk} and {xnk}. Since the sequences
{sn} and {xn} are arbitrary, upper hemi-continuity of Γc is proved.
(iii) Consider an arbitrary sequence {sn, an} with (sn, an) ∈ S × R3 for any n,
converging to a limit (s, a) ∈ S × R3. We can use the Bounded Conver-
gence Theorem (remember that the function v is bounded by assumption),
continuity of v and Ψ and equation (34) to claim that:
lim
n→∞
F (sn, an) = lim
n→∞
∫
S
v (y)Q (dy|sn, an) = lim
n→∞
∫
Z
v (Ψ (sn, an, ξ)) dP (ξ)
=
∫
Z
lim
n→∞
v (Ψ (sn, an, ξ)) dP (ξ) =
∫
Z
v (Ψ (s, a, ξ)) dP (ξ)
= F (s, a)
Since the sequence {sn, an} is arbitrary, continuity of F is proved.
We are now ready to prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists a time-invariant policy function for the CB that
solves the optimization problem 28.
Proof. This result follows from Theorem 1 of Jaskiewicz and Nowak (2011).14 The
assumptions of their Theorem are satisfied in our setup; most of them are proved
in our Lemma 1, while the existence of a one-sided majorant function that satisfies
their conditions (M1) and (M2) (see the Appendix for their exact formulation) is
trivial in our model: since the quadratic return function of the CB is non-positive,
a constant function ω (s) = 1 for any s ∈ S has the required properties.
Finally, note that their Theorem is derived in the case of a maxmin problem of
a controller in a two-players game; assuming that the second player can play only
14We report the statement of the Theorem and its assumptions in the Appendix.
17
one strategy allows us to apply their results to our model.
Next, we prove that any optimal time-invariant policy function for the problem
28 is such that the constraint (31) never binds in the optimum, if an appropriate
continuous function x (s) is chosen. We define V c (s) as the value function associ-
ated with the solution of the problem 28 for a given initial vector of states s ∈ S.15
In the following simple Lemma we characterize bounds of this value function.
Lemma 2. Assume that the shock u has finite variance σ2u. The following results
hold:
(i) For any s ∈ S and any choice of x (s):
V c (s) ≤ 0
(ii) For any s ∈ S and any choice of x (s):
V c (s) ≥ −1
2
[
(1− β)u2 + βσ2u
]
where u is the fourth component of the vector s of initial states.
Proof. (i) This follows trivially from the fact that the one-period return function
of the CB is non-positive.
(ii) For any choice of x (s), the allocation xt = 0 for any t ≥ 0 and any history of
states is always feasible; with this allocation the welfare of the CB is given
by:
E0(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
−1
2
[(
(βbpit−1 + κ)xt + ut
)2
+ αx2t
]}
=
E0(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
−1
2
(ut)
2
}
= −1
2
[
(1− β)u20 + βσ2u
]
Hence, the optimal allocation cannot deliver a welfare smaller than the one
associated with this feasible allocation.
15Note that this value function depends also on the choice of xs, even if we do not make this
dependence explicit.
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We can now state and prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. Let x (s) = 
√
(1−β)u2+βσ2u
α(1−β) , for some  > 1; then any optimal
time-invariant policy function for the problem 28 is such that the constraint (31)
never binds.
Proof. Theorem 1 of Jaskiewicz and Nowak (2011) shows that there exists a re-
cursive formulation of our maximization problem, which is the following:
V c (s) = − (1− β) 1
2
[
(βbpi + κ)x∗ (s) + u)2 + αx∗2 (s)
]
+β
∫
S
V c (s)Q (dy|s, a∗ (s))
(36)
for any s ∈ S, where the starred variables denote actions taken under any optimal
policy function. Using Lemma 2 (i) and the fact that− (1− β) 1
2
(βbpi + κ)x∗ (s) + u)2
is non-positive, we have that:
V c (s) ≤ − (1− β) 1
2
αx∗2 (s)
Now, for the sake of contradiction, let’s assume that for some s ∈ S we have that
x∗ (s) = x (s).16 This means that:
−x∗2 (s) < −(1− β)u
2 + βσ2u
α (1− β)
which implies:
V c (s) ≤ − (1− β) 1
2
αx∗2 (s) < −1
2
[
(1− β)u2 + βσ2u
]
(37)
which contradicts Lemma 2 (ii).
2.2 Convergence
So far we proved that there exists an optimal time-invariant solution to the prob-
lem 28 and that it is interior; hence, any such solution can be characterized as
16We can proceed analogously for the case x∗ (s) = −x (s).
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the solution of the standard FOCs, without having to worry about the Lagrange
multipliers on the constraints (31). The first order conditions of problem 28 are:
0 =− αxt −
[
(βbpit−1 + κ)xt + ut
]
(βbpit−1 + κ)− λ1,tγtxt−1(βbpit−1 + κ)− (38)
− Et[λ1,t+1βγt+1((βbpit + κ)xt+1 + ut+1 − bpit 2xt)]− λ2,tγtxt−1
− Et[λ2,t+1βγt+1(xt+1 − bxt 2xt)]
0 =λ1,t − βEtλ1,t+1(1− γt+1x2t )− β2Et[((βbpit + κ)xt+1 + ut+1)xt+1]− (39)
β2Et [λ1,t+1γt+1xtxt+1]
0 =λ2,t − βEtλ2,t+1(1− γt+1x2t ), (40)
where λ1,t and λ2,t are the Lagrange multipliers of (29) and (30), respectively.
These first order conditions together with the law of motion for the learning coeffi-
cients constitute the necessary conditions for the optimal evolution of {xt, bpit , bxt }.17
From equation (38) it is easy to show that the only stationary solution for λ2,t is
λ2,t = 0 for any t; hence the FOCs can be rewritten as:
0 =− αxt −
[
(βbpit−1 + κ)xt + ut
]
(βbpit−1 + κ)− λ1,tγtxt−1(βbpit−1 + κ)− (41)
− Et[λ1,t+1βγt+1((βbpit + κ)xt+1 + ut+1 − bpit 2xt)]
0 =λ1,t − βEtλ1,t+1(1− γt+1x2t )− β2Et[((βbpit + κ)xt+1 + ut+1)xt+1]− (42)
β2Et [λ1,t+1γt+1xtxt+1]
Remembering that by Proposition 1 we can concentrate on time-invariant laws of
motion for the optimal x, we can rewrite equation (41) as:
xt = Φ1
(
bpit−1
)
ut + Φ2 (st) (43)
17From the IS curve and the NKPC we can back out the optimal processes for inflation and
the nominal interest rate.
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where the vector st is the vector of state variables defined above, and:
Φ1
(
bpit−1
) ≡ − βbpit−1 + κ
α +
(
βbpit−1 + κ
)2 (44)
Φ2 (st) ≡ − 1
α +
(
βbpit−1 + κ
)2 {λ1,tγtxt−1(βbpit−1 + κ)
+Et[λ1,t+1βγt+1((βb
pi
t + κ)xt+1 + ut+1 − bpit 2xt)]} (45)
Plugging (43) into equation (29), we get the following law of motion of bpi along
any optimal path:
bpit = b
pi
t−1+γtxt−1
[
(βbpit−1 + κ)Φ1
(
bpit−1
)
ut + ut − xt−1bpit−1
]
+γtxt−1(βbpit−1+κ)Φ2 (st)
(46)
Using analogous arguments, we get that:
bxt = b
x
t−1 + γtxt−1
[
Φ1
(
bpit−1
)
ut − xt−1bxt−1
]
+ γtxt−1Φ2 (st) (47)
Our aim is to rewrite equations (46)-(47) as a Stochastic Recursive Algorithm
(SRA hereafter) in a form that can be analyzed using the stochastic approximation
tools. To do so, we start defining the vector of the state variables of the algorithm
Yt ≡ [xt, xt−1, ut, γt, ]′.18 Hence, we can rewrite (46)-(47) as follows:
bpit = b
pi
t−1 + γtHpi
(
bpit−1, Y
2
t , Y
3
t
)
+ γ2t ρpi
(
bpit−1, b
x
t−1, Y
2
t , Y
3
t , Y
4
t
)
bxt = b
x
t−1 + γtHx
(
bpit−1, Y
2
t , Y
3
t
)
+ γ2t ρx
(
bpit−1, b
x
t−1, Y
2
t , Y
3
t , Y
4
t
)
where Y it denotes the i-th entry of the Yt vector, and:
Hpi
(
bpit−1, Y
2
t , Y
3
t
) ≡ xt−1 [(βbpit−1 + κ)Φ1 (bpit−1)ut + ut − xt−1bpit−1]
Hx
(
bpit−1, Y
2
t , Y
3
t
) ≡ xt−1 [Φ1 (bpit−1)ut − xt−1bxt−1]
ρpi
(
bpit−1, b
x
t−1, Y
2
t , Y
3
t , Y
4
t
) ≡ xt−1(βbpit−1 + κ)Φ2 (st)γt
ρx
(
bpit−1, b
x
t−1, Y
2
t , Y
3
t , Y
4
t
) ≡ xt−1Φ2 (st)
γt
18Note that the vector of state variables used for the convergence analysis is different from
those used in the solution of the optimization problem.
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If we define θt ≡ [bpit , bxt ]′, and:
H (·) ≡
(
Hpi (·)
Hx (·)
)
, ρ (·) ≡
(
ρpi (·)
ρx (·)
)
equations (46)-(47) can be written as:
θt = θt−1 + γtH (θt−1, Yt) + γ2t ρ (θt−1, Yt) (48)
which is a SRA in the standard form studied in the Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
To study the asymptotic behavior of θt, we analyze the solutions and stability of
the Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) associated to (48):
dθ
dτ
= h (θ) ≡ EH
(
bpi, Ŷ 2t , Ŷ
3
t
)
(49)
where the expectation is taken over the invariant distribution of the process Ŷt (θ),
which is the stochastic process for Yt obtained by holding θt−1 at the fixed value
θt−1 = θ. It is possible to prove that there exists an invariant distribution to which
the Markov process Ŷt (θ) converges weakly from any initial conditions; hence, the
function h (θ) is well defined.19 Note that xt−1 does not depend on ut; this implies
that:
h (θ) =
(
−bpiEx2t−1 (θ)
−bxEx2t−1 (θ)
)
The only possible rest point of the ODE (49) is clearly θ = 0. Moreover it is
(locally) stable, since the Jacobian:
Dh (θ) =
(
−Ex2t−1 (θ)− bpi ∂Ex
2
t−1(θ)
∂bpi
−bpi ∂Ex2t−1(θ)
∂bx
−bx ∂Ex2t−1(θ)
∂bpi
−Ex2t−1 (θ)− bx ∂Ex
2
t−1(θ)
∂bx
)
(50)
19The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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has both eigenvalues smaller than zero when evaluated in θ = 0.20 In the termi-
nology commonly used in the adaptive learning literature, we can say that θ = 0
is the only E-stable equilibrium. From simple inspection of (50) we conclude that
this E-stability result is independent of parameters’ values.
Remark 1. The Jakobian (50) has negative eigenvalues for any value of the struc-
tural parameters.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) derive an equivalence result between E-stability
and convergence under learning. This theorem, which draws on arguments con-
tained in Benveniste, Me´tivier, and Priouret (1990), cannot directly be applied to
our problem, since the state variables’ law of motion does not satisfy the required
assumptions.21 However, it turns out that we can adapt their arguments, and
prove the following result.22
Proposition 3. Let θ evolve according to (48). If θ is E-stable, then it is locally
stable under adaptive learning.23
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 implies that in the limit θt = [b
pi
t , b
x
t ]
′ → 0. This is the only
possible E-stable equilibrium and it is locally stable. Equations (18) and (19) then
show that in the limit agents expect zero inflation and output-gap. Substituting
this together with γt → 0 into the FOC (41) and the PC (2) implies that both
output and inflation converges to the IT equilibrium (14) (15).
20We are implicitly assuming that Ex2t−1 (θ) admits partial derivatives, and that they are
finite.
21From a technical point of view, the Markov chain followed by our state variables Y is not
necessarily geometrically ergodic, hence the assumption A.4 as stated in page 216 of Benveniste,
Me´tivier, and Priouret (1990) is not satisfied (we cannot prove the existence of a solution to the
Poisson equation).
22Strictly speaking, the following result does not establish an equivalence between E-stability
and convergence under learning, since it does not guarantee that any locally stable equilibrium
is E-stable. However, our numerical investigation shows that this is the case.
23For an explicit definition of what “locally stable under adaptive learning” means, see Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) page 275.
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Main result 1. Optimal policy drives the economy to the inflation targeting equi-
librium
xt = − κ
α + κ2
ut
pit =
α
α + κ2
ut.
3 Policy implications
In the previous section we established that the optimal policy drives agents’ beliefs
to the inflation targeting equilibrium. In order to explain the intuition behind this
result, in this section we describe the short and long run policy tradeoffs.
3.1 Welfare implications
In order to quantify the long run and short run tradeoffs, we use numerical meth-
ods. We use the FOCs (41)-(42) and solve for λ1,t and xt, using a collocation
algorithm. We approximate the control variables with Chebychev polynomials, as
functions of the state variables (xt−1, bpit−1 and ut)
24. The optimal approximated
policy functions are then used to simulate the series.
The benchmark calibration is taken from Woodford (1999) (see table 1). In
order to avoid the effect of a changing gain parameter, and focus entirely on the
short versus long run trade-off, we simulate the model for a small constant gain
parameter. The reason is that, with decreasing gain learning, the first observations
of the simulated series are strongly affected by the value of the gain parameter
γt =
1
t
. Simulations starting from period 1, where γ1 = 1, are quantitatively
different from simulations starting from period 1000, where γ1 = 0.001. To abstract
from the effect of a changing gain parameter, we prefer to present our results only
24We make use of the Miranda-Fackler CompEcon Toolbox. We use tensor product to project
the multimensional state space on the policy space, and Gaussian quadrature to compute the
expectation operators. The solution is found by using a version of the Broyden algorithm for
nonlinear equations coded by Michael Reiter. Uniqueness of the solution might be an issue, since
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are only necessary in our setup. However, we experimented with
several initial conditions and different interpolation techniques, and the solution did not change.
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Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Value
β 0.99
σ 0.157
κ 0.024
α 0.04
γ 0.05
σ2u 0.07
Gaussian cost-push
shock, Eu = 0.
for constant gain. However, the qualitative behaviour of the series is the same
under constant and decreasing gain. The decreasing gain results are available
upon request. We set γ = 0.05, which is a value consistent with estimates for
the US economy (see Milani (2007), Branch and Evans (2006) and Slobodyan and
Wouters (2012)). Robustness checks for several of the model parameters have been
performed and are available upon request.
Figure 1: Dynamics of bpi and bx under constant gain, benchmark parameterization,
γ = .05
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Figure 1 provides an example of the evolution of the learning coefficients bpit
and bxt for a single simulated path of u: it shows that the optimal policy drives
beliefs to the IT equilibrium, and this equilibrium is stable: once reached this
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equilibrium, agents’ beliefs remain very close to it. The learning coefficients bpit
and bxt converge to zero, thus inflation and output gap expectations (18-19) do not
depend on lagged output gap and converge to zero too.
The welfare benefits of the optimal policy are substantial. In table 2 we com-
pare welfare losses from the optimal policy to the losses obtained with a Taylor-type
rule that keeps learning agents in the PLT equilibrium (as shown in Evans and
Honkapohja (2006)).25 We perform a Monte Carlo with simulation length of 5000
periods and a cross-sectional sample size of 10000, and express welfare losses as
consumption equivalent in terms of steady state consumption. The loss of PLT is
63% percent higher than that of the optimal rule, when starting from beliefs con-
sistent with PLT. The same measure is 35% higher for the optimal policy when we
start from beliefs consistent with IT. Therefore, our optimal policy is significantly
better than a PLT rule.
Table 2: Consumption equivalents
Optimal policy Price level targeting Ratio (PLTOP )
Initial beliefs
Inflation targeting 0.000744 0.001004 1.35
Price level targeting 0.000411 0.000673 1.63
γ = 0.05.
3.2 Welfare decomposition: short vs long run
The optimal policy’s welfare gains (with respect to the PLT Taylor rule) can
be decomposed in short run losses and long term benefits. To illustrate this, in
Figure 2 we produce a consumption equivalent measure of welfare losses over a
rolling window, for the optimal policy (blue line). We then compare our optimal
policy with the Taylor rules that keep beliefs respectively to PLT (red line) and
IT (black line) equilibria26.
The graph should be read in the following way: a point at time t in the blue line
corresponds to the consumption equivalent measure of the optimal policy start-
25This rule also guarantees determinacy under RE.
26The latter is taken from Evans and Honkapohja (2003).
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ing from the belief in period t, averaged over 10000 simulations of 2000 periods’
length. For example, at period 1000 we have the average consumption equivalent
for the optimal policy starting with beliefs at period 1000. PLT and IT policies are
obtained in an analogous way. The only difference is in the initial beliefs: for PLT
and OP, we set them at the PLT value. IT policy instead is simulated starting
from IT beliefs. In this way, we expect to see the optimal policy welfare measure
converge to the IT one.
Figure 2: Consumption equivalents losses, on a rolling window
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Montecarlo of 10000 simulations. Initial beliefs at price level targeting for OP and PLT, at
inflation targeting for IT, γ = 0.05.
First of all, Figure 2 shows that the welfare ranking of the two Taylor rules
under learning are similar to the one under RE: the per period welfare losses of
IT are higher than that of PLT in each period. Moreover, from this graph, we
can see that the policymaker sacrifices long run efficiency for short run gains. In
the initial periods, welfare losses from the optimal policy are clearly smaller than
the PLT rule. However, optimal policy’s losses are larger than those generated by
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a PLT rule in the long run, as the optimal policy tends asymptotically to the IT
policy. The intuition is straightforward: in the short run, the optimal policy can
respond quickly to a shock due also to almost constant expectations, while PLT
policy response need to anchor future inflation expectations by committing to a
long sequence of future output contractions. Hence, in the short run the optimal
policy has an advantage in terms of welfare: it can close the wedge created by
the shock in a very short time without large impact on inflation expectations.
However, in the long run, as the optimal policy drives agents’ beliefs away from
PLT, the policymaker looses its ability to anchor agents’ inflation expectations.
Its policy therefore resembles more the IT policies, which are welfare inferior to
PLT.
3.3 Short run policy incentives
The short run gains come from the well known time inconsistency problem of price
level targeting and the sluggishness of agents’ beliefs. The time inconsistency is
standard: if given the chance, the central bank has an incentive to renege its
commitments and choose a different policy which is optimal at the time the decision
is taken. Under rational expectations, any deviation from a commitment will be
immediately spotted by agents, making any future commitment of the central
bank not credible anymore. However, under learning things are different: small
deviations from PLT, for example, can be “interpreted” by agents as a mistake in
their estimated model of the economy.
This can be easily illustrated by looking at the first order conditions of the
central bank. Let us first assume that agents do not update their beliefs, so γt = 0
and learning coefficients are not updated. Let us also assume that by some period k
agents believe that the central bank is implementing the PLT policy, hence bxk = b
x
and bpik = b
pi. Agents’ expectations are then equal to the RE equilibrium under
PLT: E∗t pit+1 = b
pixt, E
∗
t xt+1 = b
xxt, ∀t ≥ k. However, given these assumptions,
the optimal policy is strikingly different from PLT. By combining the FOCs (41)-
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(42) and the PC (2) we get
xt = − βb
pi + κ
α + (βbpi + κ)2
ut
pit =
α
α + (βbpi + κ)2
ut.
(51)
When the learning is shut down, the central bank optimal policy does not depend
on xt−1, as in the PLT equilibrium (7-8). Instead, its policy is qualitatively similar
to the “leaning against the wind” strategy of IT: after a positive shock, the CB
decreases current output gap in order to avoid a huge increase in current inflation.
This reaction is stronger the larger is bpi, i.e. the further away expectations are
from the IT policy: intuitively, the higher bpi, the stronger is the trade-off between
inflation and output (from the Phillips curve (2)), and therefore the stronger is
the incentive of the central bank to “fool” agents.
Things are slightly different if we allow for learning, i.e. if γt > 0. This im-
plies that agents are learning from the realized allocations and they eventually
understand when the central bank deviates from the PLT. Agents endowed with
rational expectations would immediately loose any faith in the central bank cred-
ibility after a deviation, and they would assume that the prevailing equilibrium in
the future will be IT. On the other hand, learning agents revise their beliefs in a
more sluggish fashion. Because of this sluggishness, and similarly to the case in
which there is no learning at all, the policymaker has still an incentive to “sur-
prise” the households repeatedly, by choosing allocations different from expected
ones. The central bank implements these surprises by aggressively contracting
output to disinflate. Figures 3a and 3b show the impulse response functions for
inflation and output, starting from PLT beliefs. Compared to PLT, after a posi-
tive cost-push shock the OP engineers a much bigger output contraction in order
to keep inflationary pressures at bay. With respect to PLT, the welfare gain of
lower inflation outweighs the welfare loss of a larger output gap, since in the New
Keynesian model price rigidity is the most important friction. When inflation is
lower, firms that cannot adjust their prices have a less distorted price, and their
output is closer to the (flexible prices) efficient output. However, this policy is not
consistent with agents’ beliefs, since they were expecting a PLT policy, and hence
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they will make forecasting mistakes. Households will learn from these mistakes by
updating their beliefs as shown in figure 1. In the limit households learn that the
central bank is not implementing a PLT policy, and their beliefs slowly converge
to the IT equilibrium.
Figure 3: Impulse responses after a one standard deviation cost-push shock, under
optimal policy under learning (OP ) and price-level targeting policy (PLT ) , start-
ing with initial beliefs corresponding to the rational expectations PLT equilibrium,
with γ = 0.05.
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The impulse response of the price level shows even more strikingly how our
optimal policy differs from PLT. Figure 3c shows that the optimal response after a
positive cost-push shock is to allow the price level to raise permanently (similarly
to what would happen under an IT rule), while under PLT the central bank would
bring the price level back to the target. In other words, price level stabilization
is not optimal when agents are learning, and the central bank should let prices
absorb shocks in a permanent way.
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3.4 Non-linearity of the optimal policy
The optimal policy is a non-linear function of household expectations, therefore it
cannot be expressed as a Taylor type rule. To illustrate this, Figure 4 (panel a)
shows the first period output contraction x1 that the central bank engineers after
a positive cost-push shock, for different inflation beliefs bpi0 .
Figure 4: Impulse responses of inflation and output gap after a one standard
deviation cost-push shock, under optimal policy under learning (OP ) and price-
level targeting policy (PLT ) , starting with initial beliefs corresponding to the
rational expectations PLT equilibrium, with γ = 0.05.
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(a) Impulse effect on output gap as
a function of beliefs, for OP and
PLT policies
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(b) Impulse effect on output gap as
a function of beliefs, for different γ
The PLT impact is a linear, slightly increasing function of the beliefs by con-
struction, since this is a linear expectations-based interest rate rule derived in
Evans and Honkapohja (2006). The further away beliefs are from the PLT equi-
librium, the larger the output contraction that PLT policy engineers, in order to
drive household beliefs back to the PLT equilibrium. Optimal policy, on the other
hand, is non-linear in inflation beliefs and, in contrast to PLT, it is decreasing in
bpi0 . In other words, the closer household beliefs are to the PLT equilibrium, the
larger is the output contraction engineered, and the larger is the difference with
PLT. The reason for this is that the closer beliefs are to PLT, the more the cen-
tral bank can decrease next periods’ inflation expectations by contracting output
without substantially affecting agents’ beliefs, therefore the incentives to exploit
the inflation-output tradeoff are bigger.
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Those same incentives also depend on the gain parameter. The smaller is
the gain parameter, the more hawkish the central bank is: it engineers a bigger
output contraction (Figure 4, panel b). With a small gain parameter agents learn
slowly and optimal policy can exploit the Phillips curve and aggressively disinflate
without loosing its ability to affect private sectors’ expectations.
4 Discussion
The results we derived show that optimality of price level targeting is not robust to
relaxing rationality bounds of private agents. When private agents use past data
to form beliefs about the future instead of being fully rational, price level target-
ing is still beneficial in effectively anchoring inflation expectations, but monetary
policy has strong short run incentives to deviate from it. These incentives arise
because learning agents need time to uncover that the central bank has deviated
from PT, and in the meantime the policymaker can exploit the inflation-output
tradeoff and disinflate by aggressively contracting output. This policy comes at a
cost, private agents eventually gather enough data and understand that the central
bank is deviating from PT. The economy converges to IT and the central bank
looses its ability to anchor private expectations. We show that the short run gains
of this policy outweigh long run losses, therefore it is optimal for the central bank
to succumb to the temptation and deviate from price level targeting.
The central bank incentives that arise in our framework have been previously
ignored by proponents of price level targeting under learning (see Evans and
Honkapohja (2006), Aoki and Nikolov (2006), Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2007)).
These authors showed that price level targeting is a learnable equilibrium: if ex-
pectations are perturbed out of the price level targeting equilibrium, the central
bank can implement a policy that makes agents learn the price level targeting
equilibrium again. However, once central bank incentives are taken into account,
PLT is no longer optimal if agents are learning.
A general message from our results is that in a heterogenous agents setup, it is
not enough to examine learnability of an equilibria, as it is traditionally done in the
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literature (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001)). Even a learnable equilibria might
not arise when interactions between agents are taken into account. The incentives
of a rational player (in our model the central bank) depend on what type of other
player she interacts with. Adaptive players are different from rational players even
after they learned a rational expectations equilibria, and their forecast could not
be distinguished from that of a rational agent. One difference is the speed of re-
vising beliefs. A rational agent would immediately understand if the central bank
has deviated from PT and would immediately switch to the IT equilibrium. A
learning agent on the other hand needs time to gather sufficient amount of data to
understand that the central bank deviated from PT. A second, more subtle differ-
ence is that rational agents can choose a strategy that prescribes totally different
behavior on and off-equilibrium, and the off-equilibrium threat of rational private
agents can keep a rational bank from deviating from PT (see Kurozumi (2008)).
For learning agents, on the other hand, off-equilibrium threats are not possible,
since they simply form beliefs based on realized outcomes. A rational opponent to
learning agents takes this into account and chooses her strategy accordingly.
In our setup, the central bank incentives to deviate from PT cannot be turned
around by appointing a conservative central banker, in a way analogous to what
suggested in Rogoff (1985). Even if the central banker cares strongly about damp-
ening inflation fluctuations, these incentives remain.
To be clear, we are not claiming that price level targeting should never be
used by central banks. Our claim is that central banks have incentives to deviate
from this policy when agents are learning. As learning is found to be empirically
relevant,27 we think these central bank incentives should not be neglected. One
caveat of our findings is that many empirical and policy-oriented models are a more
complex representation of the economy than our setup (see Smets and Wouters
(2007)). For example, many researchers add various exogenous sources of persis-
tence. We cannot exclude that other sources of persistence might interact with
learning and provide different policy incentives than in our paper. Unfortunately,
introducing these features in our model would make it analytically and numerically
intractable.
27See for example Del Negro and Eusepi (2011), Slobodyan and Wouters (2012), Molnar and
Ormeno (2014).
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A few of our assumptions play an important role in our findings, and therefore
we would like to discuss their limitations. Firstly, we conduct our analysis by
assuming a specific learning algorithm. Even if this learning algorithm is widely
used in the literature, and it is consistent with the rational expectation equilibrium,
it might seem arbitrary. Yet it is equally arbitrary to assume that there is no
learning component to private expectations, especially since this is at odds with
recent empirical findings. Ultimately, how people form expectations is an empirical
issue, which is yet unsettled. We agree with Marcet and Nicolini (2003) that
rationality bounds should be placed on learning, and we think it would be beneficial
to expand both empirical and theoretical research in this direction. As this is
beyond the scope of this paper, for the time being, we would like to emphasize
that it should not be ignored that central bank incentives change when there is a
learning component to agents’ beliefs.
Secondly, we assume the central bank knows the exact learning algorithm
agents use. This is undoubtedly a strong assumption, nevertheless an analo-
gously strong assumption is regularly made in optimal policy research with ra-
tional agents, where the policymaker knows that agents are rational. We do think
it is worth making our extreme assumption in order to understand optimal policy
under the polar case of adaptive learning. Assessing the consequences of interme-
diate forms of rationality would require their explicit modelling, and we do not
rule out the possibility that different policy incentives would arise in an alternative
setting.
5 Conclusions
This paper has shown that stabilizing prices is a bad strategy if agents do not
have perfectly rational expectations. We have examined an optimal monetary
policy problem in a setup where agents are adaptive learners, and our main result
shows that a benevolent central bank should not counteract the effects of economic
fluctuations on the price level. The optimal policy instead let prices absorb the
effects of shocks in a permanent way. Qualitatively, the optimal policy resembles
a “leaning against the wind” policy.
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There is a large literature that examines the policy implications of standard
monetary policy prescriptions in economies where agents are adaptive learners.
Contrary to the approach in the previous literature, our optimal policy design
takes into account the incentives of the policymaker. In this setup, a good policy-
maker sacrifices the long run benefits of stabilizing prices for the short run gains
coming from exploiting the inflation-output trade-off, by taking into account the
expectations formation mechanism of the private sector. This result is in line with
some observed features of the practice of monetary policy. Central banks rou-
tinely monitor private sector’s expectations, and are reluctant to introduce price
level stabilization as their official policy objective.
We do not mean to give precise policy prescriptions to central banks. We are
aware that policymaking in reality is more complex and challenging than in our
simple framework. Our results however should highlight that the incentives of
the central bank change with the expectation formation mechanism of the private
sector, and policy prescriptions derived without acknowledging this fact can be
misleading.
An important question is how general our result is. We conjecture that it
is common to a large class of Stackelberg games, where a leader makes optimal
decisions by explicitly taking into account the expectations formation mechanism
of the follower. We leave this extension to future research.
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Appendix
In this Appendix we prove proposition 3. To do so, we first show a series of
intermediate results.
First of all, we state and prove the following technical Lemma.
Lemma 3. Let λ1,t be a stationary solution of (42), and suppose that θt is fixed
at some θ; then, for any compact Q ⊂ R2, there exists a positive constant Cλ such
that:
|λ1,t| ≤ Cλ
(
1 + |ut|2
)
(A.1)
for any θ ∈ Q.
Proof. Solving forward equation (42), we get that any stationary solution must
satisfy:
λ1,t = β
2Et
∞∑
i=1
{
βi [((βbpi + κ)xt+1+i + ut+1+i)xt+1+i] Π
i
j=0ϑt+j
}
+
+β2Et [((βb
pi + κ)xt+1 + ut+1)xt+1] (A.2)
where ϑt+j is defined as follows:
ϑt = 1, ϑt+j = 1− γt+jxt+j−1 (xt+j−1 − βxt+j) for j > 0
Let x (ut) be defined as in the statement of Proposition 2, let:
pi (ut) ≡MQx (ut) + ut
where MQ ≡ maxθ∈Q(βbpi + κ).28 Moreover, note that for any j > 0:
|ϑt+j| = |1− γt+jxt+j−1 (xt+j−1 − βxt+j)| ≤ 1 + γt+j |xt+j−1|2 + βγt+j |xt+j−1xt+j|
< 1 + γ1+j |x (ut+j−1)|2 + βγ1+j |x (ut+j−1)x (ut+j)| ≡ ϑt+j
where we used the triangle inequality, the fact that the sequence of gains is decreas-
ing, and the result of Proposition 2 that at an optimum we must have |xt| < x (ut).
28This maximum exists, since the function is continuous and Q is compact by assumption.
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Because the stochastic process of u is assumed to be iid, it follows that ϑt+j is in-
dependent of x (ut+1+i) and pi (ut+1+i), for any j ≤ i. Using this observation, the
bounds derived on x, ((βbpi + κ)x+ u) and ϑ, the triangle inequality, the Schwartz
inequality, the monotonicity of the expectation operator, we can write:
|λ1,t| ≤ β2Mx,piEt
∞∑
i=1
{
βiΠij=0ϑt+j
}
+ β2Mx,pi
where Mx,pi ≡ Etx (ut+1+i)pi (ut+1+i) which is constant for any t and any i because
of the iid assumption. Note that the series in the RHS of the above inequality
converges, since β < 1 and limj→∞Etϑt+j = 1. Finally, note that the only ϑt+j
that depends on ut is ϑt+1; hence, we can write the above inequality as follows:
|λ1,t| ≤ β2Mx,piEt
∞∑
i=2
{
βi
[
Πij=2ϑt+j
] [
1 + γ2 |x (ut)|2 + βγ2 |x (ut)x (ut+1)|
]}
+
β3Mx,piEt
[
1 + γ2 |x (ut)|2 + βγ2 |x (ut)x (ut+1)|
]
+ β2Mx,pi
= β2Mx,pi
[
1 + γ2 |x (ut)|2
]
Et
∞∑
i=2
βi
[
Πij=2ϑt+j
]
+
β3Mx,piγ2x (ut)Et
∞∑
i=2
βi
{[
Πij=2ϑt+j
]
x (ut+1)
}
+
β3Mx,pi
[
1 + γ2 |x (ut)|2 + βγ2x (ut)Etx (ut+1)
]
+ β2Mx,pi
≤ Ĉλ
(
1 + |ut|+ |ut|2
)
(A.3)
where we used the fact that, due to the iid assumption on u, the conditional
expectations of the random variables considered in (A.3) are independent of t, and
the definition of x (ut) to get:
x (s) = 
√
(1− β)u2 + βσ2u
α (1− β) ≤ 
√
[(1− β) |u|+ βσu]2
α (1− β) = 
(1− β) |u|√
α (1− β)+
βσu√
α (1− β)
Finally, note that inequality (A.3) implies that there exists a Cλ such that (A.1)
holds.29 This completes the proof.
29For example, Cλ = 3Ĉλ would work.
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We can now state and prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 4. Let θt evolve according to (48), and fix an open set D ⊂ R2
around the point θ = 0. Then, for any compact Q ⊂ D, there exist C and q such
that for any θ ∈ Q:
|ρ (θ, Y )| ≤ C (1 + |Y |q) (A.4)
Proof. In what follows, we show that a bound of the form reported in the above
inequality holds for the absolute value of any of the two components of the function
ρ(·), which clearly implies (A.4).
Let’s start from ρpi(·); plugging equation (45) into the definition of this function
we get:
∣∣ρpi (bpit−1, bxt−1, Y 2t , Y 3t , Y 4t )∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣−xt−1 (βbpit−1 + κ)α + (βbpit−1 + κ)2
{
λ1,txt−1(βbpit−1 + κ)
+β
γt+1
γt
Et[λ1,t+1((βb
pi
t + κ)xt+1 + ut+1 − bpit 2xt)]
}∣∣∣∣
≤ βM2 |Et[λ1,t+1((βbpit + κ)xt+1 + ut+1 − bpit 2xt)]|
+M1 |xt−1|2 |λ1,t| (A.5)
where we used the triangle inequality and the fact that γt+1
γt
< 1, and where:
M1 ≡ max
θ∈Q
(βbpit−1 + κ)
2
α +
(
βbpit−1 + κ
)2 , M2 ≡ maxθ∈Q (βbpit−1 + κ)α + (βbpit−1 + κ)2
Using Lemma 3, we can write:
M1 |xt−1|2 |λ1,t| ≤M1 |xt−1|2Cλ
(
1 + |ut|2
) ≤M1Cλ |xt−1|2+2M1Cλ max{|xt−1|2 , |ut|2}
Remember that the max between two real numbers define a norm on R2; by
the well-known result that in a finite-dimensional normed linear space any two
norms are equivalent, there exists a positive constant Ĉ such that max {z1, z2} ≤
Ĉ (|z1|+ |z2|) for any (z1, z2) ∈ R2, where |z1|+ |z2| is a p-norm with p = 1. Hence,
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we get:
M1Cλ |xt−1|2 + 2M1Cλ max
{|xt−1|2 , |ut|2} ≤ M1Cλ |xt−1|2 + C1 (1 + |xt−1|2 + |ut|2)
≤ C (1 + |xt−1|2 + |ut|2 + |γt|2)
Using similar arguments, we can obtain similar bounds for the term:
βM2 |Et[λ1,t+1((βbpit + κ)xt+1 + ut+1 − bpit 2xt)]|
which implies that the condition in the statement of the Proposition holds for ρpi(·)
with q = 2. In the case of ρx(·) the proof is analogous.
The above Proposition implies that the assumptions made in Benveniste, Me´tivier,
and Priouret (1990) on the SRA are satisfied by our model. In what follows, we
show that the result that E-stability implies learnability holds even if we do not
invoke their assumptions on the state variables’ law of motion.
Following the steps described in Benveniste, Me´tivier, and Priouret (1990),
Chapter 1 Part II, we rewrite the learning algorithm as follows
θt = θt−1 + γth (θt−1) + t−1 (A.6)
where:
t−1 = γt [H (θt−1, Yt)− h (θt−1) + γtρ (θt−1, Yt)] (A.7)
Heuristically, what we want to obtain are bounds on the fluctuations of the
error term t−1; more generally, we look for upper bounds of the expressions:
t−1 (φ) = φ (θt)− φ (θt−1)− γtφ′ (θt−1)h (θt−1) (A.8)
where φ is an arbitrary twice continuously differentiable function from R2 to R
with bounded second derivatives, and φ′ is its gradient. In what follows we show
that, fixing a compact set Q ⊂ R2, for any integer m there is a mean squares upper
bound for the fluctuation:
sup
n≤ m∧τ
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=0
k (φ)
∣∣∣∣∣ (A.9)
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where τ is the stopping time at which the process θ leaves for the first time the
compact set Q:
τ (Q) = inf {t : θt 6∈ Q} (A.10)
Note that the assumptions on the function φ imply that:
φ (θk+1)− φ (θk)− (θk+1 − θk)φ′ (θk) = R (φ, θk, θk+1) (A.11)
where the function R, for all θk and θk+1 has the upper bound
30
|R (φ, θk, θk+1)| ≤ |θk − θk+1|2 (A.12)
In order to find bounds on the error term k (φ), we can use equation (A.11) to
decompose it as follows:
k (φ) = φ (θk+1)− φ (θk)− γk+1φ′ (θk)h (θk)
= γk+1φ
′ (θk) (H (θk, Yk+1)− h (θk)) + γ2k+1ρ (θk, Yk+1) +R (φ, θk, θk+1)
= γk+1φ
′ (θk)
(H (θk, Yk+1) + x2k+1θk)+ γk+1φ′ (θk) (−h (θk)− x2k+1θk)+
γ2k+1ρ (θk, Yk+1) +R (φ, θk, θk+1) (A.13)
Then, the running sum from r < n to n of k (φ) on {n ≤ τ} can be written as:
n−1∑
k=r
k (φ) =
n−1∑
k=r
1k (φ)+
n−1∑
k=r+1
2k (φ)+
n−1∑
k=r+1
3k (φ)+
n−1∑
k=r
4k (φ)+
n−1∑
k=r
5k (φ)+
n−1∑
k=r
6k (φ)+ηn,r (φ)
(A.14)
30For all the details, see Benveniste, Me´tivier, and Priouret (1990) page 221.
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where:

(1)
k (φ) ≡ γk+1φ′ (θk)xk [(βbpik + κ)Φ1 (bpik)uk+1 + uk+1,Φ1 (bpik)uk+1]′(A.15)

(2)
k (φ) ≡ γk+1φ′ (θk)x2k (θk − θk−1) (A.16)

(3)
k (φ) ≡ (γk − γk+1)φ′ (θk−1)x2kθk−1 (A.17)

(4)
k (φ) ≡ γk+1φ′ (θk) θkΦ21 (bpik)
(
σ2u − u2k+1
)
(A.18)

(5)
k (φ) ≡ −γk+1φ′ (θk) θk
(
Φ22 (sk+1) + 2Φ2 (sk+1) Φ1 (b
pi
k)uk+1
)
(A.19)

(6)
k (φ) ≡ γ2k+1ρ (θk, Yk+1) +R (φ, θk, θk+1) (A.20)
ηn,r (φ) ≡ −γr+1φ′ (θr)x2rθr + γnφ′ (θn−1)x2nθn−1 (A.21)
In the above decomposition we used the definition of H and the fact that in
the optimum the square of the output gap is given by:
x2k = Φ
2
1
(
bpik−1
)
u2k + Φ
2
2 (sk) + 2Φ1
(
bpik−1
)
ukΦ2 (sk)
The terms 
(2)
k (φ), 
(3)
k (φ), 
(6)
k (φ) and ηn,r (φ) are particular cases of expressions
studied in Benveniste, Me´tivier, and Priouret (1990).31 Hence, we concentrate on

(1)
k (φ), 
(4)
k (φ) and 
(5)
k (φ). We start with 
(1)
k (φ).
Lemma 4. There exist constants A1 and q1 such that:
Ey,a
{
sup
n≤m
I (n ≤ τ)
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=0
1k (φ)
∣∣∣∣∣
}2
≤ A1 (1 + |y|q1)
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1 (A.22)
where Ey,a denotes expectations taken with respect to the distribution of histories
induced by the transition probability of the Markov chain (Yk, θk) with initial con-
ditions Y0 = y and θ0 = a. Moreover, on {τ ≤ ∞},
∑n−1
k=0 
1
k converges a.s. and in
L2.
Proof. Let’s define:(
(βbpik + κ)Φ1 (b
pi
k)uk+1 + uk+1
Φ1 (b
pi
k)uk+1
)
I (k + 1 ≤ τ) ≡ Zk (A.23)
31See Lemmas 3-6, pages 225-228.
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and:
Zn ≡
n−1∑
k=0
γk+1φ
′ (θk)xkZk (A.24)
Equipped with these definitions, we can make four crucial observations: (i) Zn is a
martingale with respect to the σ-algebra Fn generated by θ0, Y0, Y1, ..., Yn: u is a
zero mean iid shock, which implies that Zk is a martingale difference with respect
to Fk; (ii) the following inequality holds:
I (n ≤ τ)
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=0
1k (φ)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ |Zn| (A.25)
and (iii) the fact that Zk is a martingale difference with respect to Fk implies
that32:
E |Zn|2 =
n−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1Eφ
′ (θk)
2 x2kZ
2
k (A.26)
Finally, (iv) we note that:
Ex2kZ
2
k ≤ Ex (uk)2 Z2k ≤ A˜1 (1 + |y|q1) (A.27)
where we used the upper bound on the absolute value of the output gap in an
optimum derived in the construction of the recursive representation of the CB
problem, the assumption that u is an iid with finite moments and the fact that we
are considering θ’s inside a compact set.
We can combine these four observations with the Doob’s martingale inequality
as in Benveniste, Me´tivier, and Priouret (1990), Lemma 2 page 224, to conclude
that:
E
{
sup
n≤m
I (n ≤ τ)
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=0
1k (φ)
∣∣∣∣∣
}2
≤ E
{
sup
n≤m
|Zn|2
}
≤ 4 sup
n≤m
E |Zn|2 (A.28)
≤ A1 (1 + |y|q1)
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1 (A.29)
32See Evans and Honkapohja (1998), page 81 for the details.
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hence proving the first part of the Lemma; note that we again used the fact that
φ′ (θ) is a continuous function defined on a compact set, and hence has a maximum.
The second part of the Lemma is a simple implication of the first one, and of the
results derived to obtain it.33
Lemma 5. There exist constants A4 and q4 such that:
Ey,a
{
sup
n≤m
I (n ≤ τ)
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=0
4k (φ)
∣∣∣∣∣
}2
≤ A4 (1 + |y|q4)
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1 (A.30)
Moreover, on {τ ≤ ∞}, ∑n−1k=0 1k converges a.s. and in L2.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one of Lemma 4, once we note that:
I (k + 1 ≤ τ) θkΦ21 (bpik)
(
σ2u − u2k+1
)
(A.31)
is a martingale difference with respect to Fk.
Lemma 6. There exist constants A5 and q5 such that:
Ey,a
{
sup
n≤m
I (n ≤ τ)
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=0
5k (φ)
∣∣∣∣∣
}2
≤ A5 (1 + |y|q5)
(
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1
)2
(A.32)
Proof. First of all, let’s define:
Dn ≡
n−1∑
k=0
I (k + 1 ≤ τ) 5k (φ) (A.33)
and note that:
sup
n≤m
I (n ≤ τ)
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=0
5k (φ)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ supn≤m |Dn| ≤ supn≤m
n−1∑
k=0
I (k + 1 ≤ τ) ∣∣5k (φ)∣∣
≤
m−1∑
k=0
I (k + 1 ≤ τ) ∣∣5k (φ)∣∣ (A.34)
33See Benveniste, Me´tivier, and Priouret (1990), Lemma 2, page 225.
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Moreover, we can use the same arguments used to derive polynomial bounds
for the function |ρ (θ, Y )| to get:
∣∣5k (φ)∣∣ = ∣∣γk+1φ′ (θk) θk (Φ22 (sk+1) + 2Φ2 (sk+1) Φ1 (bpik)uk+1)∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣γk+1φ′ (θk) θk
(
γ2k+1
(
Φ2 (sk+1)
γk+1
)2
+ 2γk+1
Φ2 (sk+1)
γk+1
Φ1 (b
pi
k)uk+1
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣γ2k+1φ′ (θk) θk
((
Φ2 (sk+1)
γk+1
)2
+ 2
Φ2 (sk+1)
γk+1
Φ1 (b
pi
k)uk+1
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣γ2k+1φ′ (θk) θkA˜5 (1 + |Yk+1|q5)∣∣∣
Putting these results together, and using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we
get:
E
{
sup
n≤m
I (n ≤ τ)
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=0
5k (φ)
∣∣∣∣∣
}2
≤ E
{
m−1∑
k=0
I (k + 1 ≤ τ) ∣∣5k (φ)∣∣
}2
≤
(
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1
)(
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1E
{
I (k + 1 ≤ τ)
∣∣∣φ′ (θk) θkA˜5 (1 + |Yk+1|q5)∣∣∣2})
≤ A5 (1 + |y|q5)
(
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1
)2
We can now state and prove our main result.
Proposition 5. There exist constants A and q such that:
Ey,a
{
sup
n≤m
I (n ≤ τ)
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
k=0
k (φ)
∣∣∣∣∣
}2
≤ A (1 + |y|q)
(
1 +
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1
)
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1
(A.35)
Moreover, on {τ ≤ ∞}, ∑n−1k=0 1k converges a.s. and in L2.
Proof. The decomposition of the error term  (φ) derived above, together with
Lemmas 4-6 and the arguments in Benveniste, Me´tivier, and Priouret (1990),
Lemmas 3-6, pages 225-228, imply that the first term in the inequality (A.35) is
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bounded above by expressions of the form:
Ai (1 + |y|qi)
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1 or Ai (1 + |y|qi)
(
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1
)2
(A.36)
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have that:(
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1
)2
≤
(
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1
)(
m−1∑
k=0
γ2k+1
)
(A.37)
which implies that the inequality (A.35) holds. The second part of the Proposition
is a trivial consequence of these upper bounds.
Proof of Proposition 3. In the above Proposition we have established upper
bounds on the fluctuations of the error term  (φ); in particular, our result is the
exact counterpart of Proposition 7 of Benveniste, Me´tivier, and Priouret (1990),
pages 228-229. The rest of the arguments leading to their convergence result
(Theorem 13, page 236) go through also in our setup, so that we can conclude
saying that E-stability does imply (local) stability under learning in our model.
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